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Abstract In this essay I compare Nussbaum’s and Arendt’s approach to narr-
ativity. The point of the comparison is to find out which approach is more adequate
for practical philosophy: the approach influenced by cognitive theory (Nussbaum)
or the one influenced by hermeneutic phenomenology (Arendt). I conclude that
Nussbaum’s approach is flawed by methodological solipsism, which is due to her
application of cognitive theory.
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Introduction
For some time now, narrativity has been a popular theme and tool of reflection in
philosophy and the human sciences. Not surprisingly, cognitive theory and
hermeneutic phenomenology stand out as the most used approaches. The cognitive
approach emphasizes the narrative structure of the self, consciousness, memory,
experience, and identity. It conceives of narrative as integrative work, producing the
continuity and coherence without which identity, experience, and memory would not
be possible. To cite a popular source, according to Daniel Dennett identity is
conferred by the multiple tales we hear and tell throughout our lifetime, hence the
title of a famous essay ‘‘The self is a center of narrative gravity’’ (1992). One doesn’t
have to share Dennett’s anti-essentialist materialist leanings in order to appreciate the
point cognitive theory is making. It in fact concurs with conceptions of narrativity
coming from the quite different quarter of hermeneutic phenomenology. In Time and
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Narrative, and more extensively in Oneself as Another, Ricoeur makes similar claims
concerning the integrative function of narratives. He even extends this function to the
whole of our lives: ‘‘We equate life with the stories that we tell about it. The act of
telling would seem to be the key to the sort of connection to which we allude when
we speak with Dilthey of the coherence of life.’’ (1991, p. 195)
The convergence of the conclusions of cognitive science and hermeneutic
phenomenology with respect to narrativity is the more convincing as they are
arrived at along different roads—the empiricist experimental method and naturalist
partiality of the former, and the reflective interpretive method and synthesizing
propensity of the latter—and informed by different views of human life. Whereas
cognitive theory focuses on the mind as the distinctive feature of the human species,
hermeneutic phenomenology emphasizes the worldly, as opposed to natural,
character of human existence.
In this essay I will compare both approaches to narrativity with the object of
assessing their adequacy and usefulness in practical philosophy. My hypothesis is
that the cognitive approach, with its emphasis on mental activities and ‘‘represen-
tational structures’’ (Thagard 2004), is too narrow to be able to do full justice to the
practical aspects of human life. Exactly how this affects its approach and use of
narrative is what I want to find out by the comparison. In order to have a productive
comparison and to avoid a foregone conclusion I need two authors who are similar
enough in that they have worked in the field of practical philosophy and showed
considerable interest in the issue of narrativity, while at the same time are dissimilar
in the approach they take. Martha Nussbaum and Hannah Arendt are the perfect
candidates. Both are practical philosophers who, dissatisfied with the state of
modern moral and political philosophy, turned to classical Greek examples and
introduced narrative material and style in order to improve the content and method
of practical philosophy. But whereas Nussbaum is influenced by cognitive theory,
Arendt is indebted to hermeneutic phenomenology.
I will first introduce some pertinent features of Nussbaum’s work, followed by a
discussion of her view and use of narrative in relation to practical understanding and
judgment, and addressing the question of whether and in what way her cognitive
approach affects her use of narrative. In the two subsequent sections I will introduce
and discuss Arendt’s work. The discussion is focused on the light her work can shed
on flaws detected in Nussbaum’s work. The last two sections will be devoted to the
exposition of methodological solipsism and the argument that the appearance of this
flaw in Nussbaum’s work is due to her application of cognitive theory. In order to
make my case I need to shift the focus of attention from the role of narratives to that
of emotions for it is in the elaboration of her conception of emotions that
Nussbaum’s adherence to cognitive theory is most extensive and significant.
Introducing Nussbaum: Ethics, Emotions and Narratives
Nussbaum is one of the most eloquent defenders of the cognitive theory of emotions.
Undercutting the traditional dualism of reason and emotion, cognitive theory
emphasizes the connection between emotion and cognition. Nussbaum follows the
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Stoic tradition in that she regards judgments as the cognitive core of emotions. For
example, my fear of someone is the judgment that that person might harm me.
Nussbaum argues for the indispensable value of emotions for (practical)
knowledge. There are some kinds of knowledge that are only accessible to us
through the experience of emotion, for instance grief or love. The importance of
emotions in Nussbaum’s practical philosophy follows from her critical view of the
standard varieties of moral philosophy. She is dissatisfied with the usual
philosophical approach to ethics because instead of reflection on real life moral
dilemmas moral philosophy offers a moral calculus (utilitarianism), conceptual
analysis (analytical philosophy), or the search for and legitimization of general rules
and principles (Kantian universalism). These approaches share two decisive
weaknesses that make them particularly unhelpful for reflection on practical issues.
The two related weaknesses are excessive formalism and rationalism. The typical
treatise of modern moral philosophy is cleansed of empirical content which appears
only, if at all, in the shape of examples illustrating the argument. Its style of
discourse is rational in the narrow sense of the word, that is, aiming at the general
rather than the particular, leaving out inductive work and bracketing emotional
involvement while concentrating on conceptual analysis and logical argument,
which elucidate general moral rules and provide deductive arguments and logical
evidence for the universality of the moral viewpoint.
In The Fragility of Goodness and Love’s Knowledge Nussbaum makes a convincing
case that the excessive formalism and rationalism of modern moral philosophy results
in reductive and sterile texts that are of little use when we want some help in
understanding and deliberating on real life moral issues. Literature, she argues, does a
much better job, for its narratives typically focus on the particularities of persons and
the complexities and ambiguities of human affairs, while its style elicits the kind of
nuanced, comprehensive, and emotionally engaged reflection that practical under-
standing and deliberation requires. She claims that reading literature educates and
strengthens practical understanding and deliberation not only because of the content of
its narratives but also, and primarily, because of its style. A good novel appeals to the
reader’s imagination, evokes emotional response, and draws readers into the story,
thereby offering them opportunities to experience, explore, test, amplify and modify
their ethical intuitions and moral rules. Moral understanding and discernment are not
about subsuming particular instances under general rules: they are about a constant
‘‘dialogue between perception and rule’’ (Nussbaum 1990, p. 157). For without
engaged perception of the particularity and contingency of the human affairs and
events in the world, the application of rules remains empty—indeed, a moral
calculus—whereas perception and emotional response without abstract reflection and
rule-governed deliberation risks the blindness that results from lack of distantiation.
The Ethics Lab of Literature
Nussbaum doesn’t, of course, merely offer an argumentconcerning the value of narratives
for practical philosophy. From The Fragility of Goodness onwards, most of her work
contains interpretations ofnarratives, ranging from Greek tragedies and work of the Stoics
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to the ‘‘stream of consciousness’’ novels of Henry James, Marcel Proust and Virginia
Woolf, and the social reality fiction of Charles Dickens, Richard Wright and others.
Though not exhaustive, this enumeration gives a good indication of what Nussbaum is
looking for in narratives. Classical tragedy does not simply ‘‘display the dilemmas of its
characters as pre-articulated,’’ but shows them ‘‘searching for the morally salient; and it
forces us, as interpreters, to be similarly active’’ (Nussbaum 1986, p. 14).
In his perceptive and critical chapter on Nussbaum, Robert Eaglestone comments on
this quotation with the observation that ‘‘literature plays a key methodological role,’’
for it bridges the gap between belief and theory (1997, p. 37). The latter refers to
Nussbaum’s Aristotelian conception of ethics as ‘‘a reflective dialogue between the
intuitions and beliefs of the interlocutor, or reader, and a series of complex ethical
conceptions, presented for exploration’’ (Nussbaum 1986, p. 10, as quoted in
Eaglestone 1997, p. 36). More precisely, the crucial methodological role of reading
narratives is to help us develop the practical faculties of understanding, deliberation, and
judgment. Literature can fulfill this role because of the way in which it unites form and
content in regard to emotions, values, and virtues. Modern ‘‘stream of consciousness’’
novels are particularly good at exploring love’s and other emotions’ knowledge. Their
protagonists show how reflection on emotional experience affords insight into deeply
held convictions and values, thereby offering the chance to judge and clarify one’s
worldview and goals in life. According to Nussbaum, the style and aspirations of the
modern novel also further political values and social virtues, in particular the
Enlightenment ideal of the equality and dignity of all human life (1995). Exemplary here
is the way in which Dickens in Hard Times, a narrative to which Nussbaum recurrently
returns, attacks the Benthamite utilitarianism of one of the protagonists (Mr. Gradgrind)
and replaces it with imaginative sympathy for the destitute and marginalized other,
thereby encouraging the virtues of empathy, broad-mindedness, and toleration.
Nussbaum’s use of narratives has not met with universal approval. Especially
professional readers of literature lament her well-intentioned but reductive use of
literature as an instrument to ‘‘cultivate humanity,’’ to paraphrase the appropriate title
of one of Nussbaum’s books (1997). The accusation of instrumentalism, though
correct, is by itself not very interesting unless good reasons are given why one
shouldn’t use literature as a means to a (praiseworthy) end. Eaglestone’s chapter is
discerning exactly because his critical observations go beyond the obvious charge of
instrumentalism. He notes that ‘‘Nussbaum continually passes over the textual nature
of a literary work and it is this which forms her crucial blindness. She understands a
text as a surface behind which there are real situations and real events,’’ and he
proceeds to make the Derridian point that Nussbaum’s work betrays a phonologo-
centrist neglect of the textuality of texts (1997, p. 46).1
1 Jacques Derrida (1976) introduced the term ‘‘phonologocentrism’’ to refer the privilege of spoken
language (phone` in Greek) over written language in the history of Western philosophy since Plato. The
reason for spoken language’s privilege is Western philosophy’s preoccupation with presence, the so-
called metaphysics of presence. In his deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence, Derrida shows that
speaking, in contrast to writing, evokes the (illusionary) experience of meaning being present in the
spoken signs, and of speakers being present to themselves, grasping their own meaning-intention. The
typical phonologocentrist attitude is, therefore, to reduce the textual or ‘‘grammatological’’ features of
written texts in favor of meanings, supposedly present behind the surface of the written signs.
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I think that Eaglestone is right to criticize Nussbaum’s representational
presuppositions but that his reasons are wrong or, to say the least, not very
convincing. In line with her conception of practical philosophy, Nussbaum takes the
amateur rather than the professional reader of literature as her starting-point: the
reader for whom the text indeed is ‘‘a surface,’’ that is, a representation of real
situations and events. To take the ordinary amateur reader as reference point is not a
weakness but, on the contrary, one of the strengths of Nussbaum’s work. But she
underestimates the sophistication of the amateur reader. The amateur reader is less
likely to suffer from the type of reductiveness professional readers are prone to
when they are looking through the lens of their favorite theory. That appears to be
the case with Nussbaum and Eaglestone. Both are guilty of similar reductive
gestures. Eaglestone and other Derridian readers are right to emphasize the
textuality of the text and, therefore, the distinction between literature and life. But
they are wrong to reject the representational link between the two on theoretical
grounds. Texts and thoughts are taken as representations of life itself because
language, from the perspective of everyday experience, appears as, and is used as, a
tool of communication and representation. That the representational model of
language is inadequate in view of philosophical or scientific explanations of
language does not, by itself, invalidate the everyday experience of language. On the
contrary, to reject this kind of everyday experience on scientific or theoretical
grounds is comparable to a scientist who insists that we are wrong in perceiving the
movement of the sun across the sky for it is really the earth circling the sun. This
kind of ‘‘scientism’’ neglects and replaces phenomenologically sound sources of
experience and knowledge.2 Nussbaum is right to take the representational link
between text and life as her starting-point but, as I will argue later on, cognitive
theory’s emphasis on the role of representational structures in cognition blinds her
to what most amateur readers intuitively know well, namely that the textual and real
life world are not at all interchangeable. Amateur readers might be unable to
articulate their implicit understanding, but their actions show that they tend to be
aware of the fact that, despite the representational mirroring of novel and life, of
thoughts and events, the experience of reflection and reading a novel is very
different from the experience of living through the happenings of real life.
What Nussbaum and Eaglestone have in common, then, is not simply a
professional reader’s penchant to be (too) attached to certain theoretical presup-
positions but, more precisely, an eagerness to replace the inconsistency of
experience—literature and reality are both similar and dissimilar—with the
consistency of theory leading to a certain reductiveness. Persuaded by the
poststructuralist theory of language, the Derridian professional reader emphasizes
the gap and censures the representational similarity of text and life. The professional
reader who works from the perspective of cognitive theories is apt to do the reverse:
2 I use the term ‘‘scientism’’ in the sense defined by John Dupre´ as the ‘‘exaggerated and often distorted
conception of what science can be expected to do or explain for us. One aspect of scientism is the idea
that any question that can be answered at all can best be answered by science’’ (2001, pp. 1–2). In my use,
however, the meaning of scientism is extended to include reference to theories originating from the
humanities and philosophy.
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take the representational similarity for granted and forget about the disparity of text
and life.
I will leave the case of the Derridian professional reader now and proceed with
my argument in regard to Nussbaum. In order to corroborate the charge of
reductiveness, I first need to detail the cognitive model Nussbaum appears to adhere
to in her work, a model I will call ‘‘the ethics lab’’ for reasons that will soon
become transparent.3
The most important claim Nussbaum makes with respect to the practical value of
reading literature is a claim concerning moral cognition. Reading literature educates
and improves our moral understanding and judgment for it allows us to get
involved, perceive, ponder, and work through the ethical complexities evoked in the
story, yet under the controlled and distanced circumstances of a reader. For
a novel, just because it is not our life, places us in a moral position that is
favorable for perception and it shows us what it would be like to take up that
position in life. We find here love without possessiveness, attention without
bias, involvement without panic (Nussbaum 1990, p. 162).
A novel, in other words, can serve the function of an ethics lab. Comparable to
scientific experiments in lab conditions that test, modify, and fine-tune scientific
hypotheses and empirical observations, the reading of literature functions like an
ethics lab in which moral cognition is tested, modified, and fine-tuned. Here as in
science, the replication of real life situations in the controlled and distanced
conditions of a carefully designed parallel world affords the reader ample
opportunity to check every detail and ponder every ambiguity, reflect on the
pertinence of moral rules and precepts, and compare with previous experience and
other narratives, without the pressures of real life conditions.
The view that narratives can serve the function of an ethics lab makes sense when
compared to the penchant for consistent but empty argument, bizarre thought
experiments, and conceptual nitpicking in (moral) philosophy. Philosophical
reflection on moral problems might indeed gain substance and pertinence if it
exposes itself to the ethics lab of literature. Underlying the model of the ethics lab is
the correct, though implicit, assumption that the experiential and cognitive
conditions of philosophical reflection and reading narratives are similar enough
for both to benefit each other. What Nussbaum seems not to be aware of, however,
is that the same is not true of the experiential and cognitive conditions of being
involved in and living through real life events. Reflection and reading have in
common not only that they deal with representations, but also that they take place in
an interior space, an inner world. Yet the experiential and cognitive conditions of
the inner world in some respects differ sharply from those of the outer world,
despite representational similarities. To read a story about, for instance, a dying
parent is very different from living through the event itself. Nussbaum would, of
course, not deny this. But the assumption underlying the ethics lab is that the
3 I borrow the felicitous description of Nussbaum’s use of and approach to narrativity in terms of an




experiential and cognitive conditions of inner and outer world are, as it were, on the
same scale and only differ in degree of emotional involvement, attentive perception,
room for reflection, etc. The stress-free, tranquil environment and leisured
concentration of the literature lab promises better results than the everyday chaos
of real life with its distractions, obligations, and emotional over-involvement.
The experiential and cognitive conditions of the inner world and outer world do
not simply differ by degree. They are not on the same scale, or, to use an old-
fashioned qualification, there is an essential difference that limits the validity of the
use of literature as a stand-in for real life. I will attempt to substantiate these claims
by way of a discussion of Arendt’s work.
Introducing Arendt: Story-telling and Politics
Arendt’s work contains a lot of stories in the conventional sense of narrative
interpretations, mostly of historical-political events—for instance the American and
French Revolution (1963/1990)—and the lives of particular people—for instance
the 18th century German Jewess Rachel Varnhagen (1958/1974), the Danish writer
Isak Dinesen, and the Marxist thinker and activist Rosa Luxemburg (1968/1995).
Her use of narrative is related to the philosophical method, or attitude would be a
more appropriate label in this case, of hermeneutic phenomenology. Though
Arendt’s phenomenological attitude has little in common with the scientific
rigorousness and abstract transcendentalism of the founder of phenomenology,
Edmund Husserl, her exposure, as a student, to the hermeneutic phenomenology of
the young Heidegger has been decisive. As the young Heidegger has done with
important concepts of human existence, Arendt’s phenomenological analyses of
political concepts attempt to uncover the experiences that underlie them in order to
achieve a better understanding of the phenomena they refer to. It is the commitment
to understanding phenomena and their underlying experiences, rather than concepts,
which defines Arendt’s phenomenological attitude and explains her use of narrative.
Story-telling in Arendt’s work is a generic term for the outcome of the process of
understanding. Understanding is a creative process of lending meaning to reality
resulting in stories.4 The effort to understand and to articulate one’s understanding
in stories is an important, and even indispensable, part of politics; for without story-
telling the public world of politics would not survive. In line with hermeneutic
phenomenology, Arendt takes human beings first and foremost as worldly creatures,
but more than any other hermeneutic phenomenologist she proceeds to uncover the
political implications of our worldliness. A world, in contrast to nature, is not a
given. It needs to be built and maintained, not only in its material infra-structure but
also, and especially, in the intangible ‘‘web of human affairs’’: that is, the events
and facts brought about by human actions (Arendt 1958/1989, pp. 181–192).
Constituted and sustained by acting and speaking people, the intangible world is
4 Considering the central place and significance of story-telling in Arendt’s work, there is surprisingly
little attention given to this aspect of her work. For useful discussions, see Elisabeth Young-Bruehl
(1977), Lisa Disch (1994/1996), Ursula Ludz (1996), Seyla Benhabib (1996), and Annabel Herzog
(2000).
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very fragile and ephemeral. It is ephemeral for acts, facts, and events lack impact
and meaning, and can even disappear altogether, unless they are recorded and given
meaning in stories of various kinds, ranging from official historiography to novels
and news stories, and from discussions among friends to debates in the media and in
parliament. The intangible world is also fragile, for its dependency on stories makes
it susceptible to ideological manipulation.
Arendt insists that the existence of a shared world is dependant on the possibility
of articulating many different views of the same reality. Without a plurality of
stories concerning human actions and the consequences thereof, the reality of the
web of human affairs will become insubstantial to the point of simply evaporating.
The articulation of plural viewpoints is the illumination, from many different
perspectives, of the same fragile, ephemeral, and contingent web of human
relationships, facts, and events—making it thereby more solid, more objective, more
real.5 Without a plurality of stories about worldly matters, the world will first loose
its character of commonality, then its meaningfulness, and finally, its reality. When
plural viewpoints are replaced by a homogenized story—an increasingly common
feature of the media in a globalized world, exemplified by the news coverage of the
Iraq war and ‘‘the war on terror’’—the typical result is a lack of factual substance.
The same images and sound-bites are repeated over and over again. Instead of
illuminating the complex web of human affairs, the overexposure to the blinding
light of just one perspective creates a sort of stark black and white dreamscape,
which has lost all nuance and haunts us instead of guiding our understanding.
The first reason why it is important to sustain and strengthen the intangible
human world by a plurality of stories is that it strengthens our sense of reality.
Human beings, social and political animals, need to be able to orient themselves in
the world, a feat that becomes harder than the less substantial the web of human
affairs is. The second reason is that politics requires the existence of a shared world
and vice versa. In contrast to its everyday conception, politics in Arendt’s sense is
not the drafting and execution of policies, nor the achievement of political goals,
but, first and foremost, the realization of plurality and freedom in word and deed.6
Without politics, that is, without people freely and publicly speaking and acting
together, there would not be a shared world at all, yet without shared world, or more
precisely, without pluralistic story-telling sustaining a common and free public
space, speech, and action of individuals cannot manifest itself: hence politics
becomes insubstantial or the kind of caricature observable in dictatorial or
totalitarian regimes.
5 Of course, things are more complicated because perspectives may dispute each other’s version of
reality, of the facts. It would to be too much of a digression to discuss Arendt’s subtle notion of the factual
here. Suffice it to say that, first, facts in Arendt’s sense are hybrids of interpretation and an event or state
of affairs, and, second, that most politically relevant discussion is about interpretation.
6 Action is the realization of freedom because only action enables us to change the status quo and
establish a new state of affairs, a new worldly reality. Plurality refers, in Arendt, to the fact that people as
actors are both equal and different. My difference with other people, the uniqueness of my person, who I




Good Stories and the Limitations of Science, Philosophy, and Literature
Arendt doesn’t explicitly discuss standards of story-telling, but from her critical
evaluation of scientific, philosophical, and literary narratives one can infer that
story-telling has to fulfill at least two standards: first, a robust concern with the
world of human affairs that is tough enough to face up to and examine ‘‘the impact
of reality and the shock of experience’’ (1951/1968, p. x) And, second, an
understanding that is flexible enough to acknowledge the contingency and plurality
of this world.
Most scientific and philosophical discourse doesn’t qualify, nor does it pretend to
qualify, as story-telling in Arendt’s sense. Scientific and philosophical discourse
may nevertheless be, and often is, pertinent to story-telling. It may have an auxiliary
role with respect to story-telling. Scientific and philosophical explanation and
knowledge are necessary, in so far as they establish and explain facts, but they are
not sufficient to make sense of the facts, which is what a good story does. Even
when they do not (solely) rely on methods of quantitative research and conceptual
analysis, the narratives of the human sciences and (practical) philosophy often fall
short of the kind of understanding exemplified by a good story. This is not
surprising, for the aim of science and philosophy is not to tell a good story but to get
a handle on the ambiguities, complexities, and contingency of acts, facts and events,
by clearing up the ambiguities, reducing the complexities, and explaining the
phenomena by fitting them in a causal and consistent pattern. If successful, the result
will be useful and applicable in a way that story-telling is not. Problematic however,
is when scientific and philosophical narratives replace story-telling, as appears to be
happening in contemporary Western society. Consistent with the prevalence of
scientism in contemporary Western society, Western democracies are more and
more turning into expertocracies in which the accounts of scientific and
philosophical experts are valued more highly, and consequently have more
influence, than the stories of amateurs. The reason to worry about this phenomenon
is because of the potential destructive impact of scientific and philosophical
narratives in politics. Because of ‘‘reason’s strong aversion to contingency’’
(Arendt 1972, p. 12), the explanations and conceptual systems of scientific and
philosophical narratives tend to not simply explain, but explain away, the
contingency of the human world.7 In many ways it is easier to stick to the causal
explanations of science and the consistent conceptual systems of philosophy than to
acknowledge the frightening unpredictability and inconsistency of factual reality—
which is what good stories force one to do. Good stories are needed exactly because
they acknowledge and try to make sense of contingent worldly reality. When expert
accounts replace stories we run the risk of being left with justifying and reductive
rationalizations, which keep the complex, confusing and terrifying worldly reality at
bay or, worse, undermine the reality of the intangible web of human affairs.
7 Cf. Arendt’s analysis of the role of ‘‘professional problem solvers,’’ members of ‘‘think tanks,’’ and
other experts in politics. They want to ‘‘discover laws by which to explain and predict political and
historical facts as though they were as necessary, and thus as reliable, as the physicists once believed
natural phenomena to be’’ (1972, pp. 11–12).
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Apart from facing up to contingency, good stories also need to acknowledge the
plurality of perspectives on acts, facts, and events. Philosophy is more likely than
science to perform poorly in this respect. Science’s empirical nature forces it to stick
to facts which, per definition, are observable in one way or another in the outside
world whereas philosophy is the result of thought processes taking place in the inner
world of the mind. For this reason philosophical narratives are more prone than
science to the fallacy of solipsism, exemplified by Descartes’ ‘‘cogito ergo sum’’
(Arendt 1971/1978, pp. 45–53). Extended stay in the inner world provides a fertile
breeding ground for the Cartesian illusion that, among all our experiences, the
experience of the thinking self is the most certain, indubitable, rock-bottom real one.
Yet, Arendt argues convincingly that the ephemeral thinking self, which only exists
as long as and in so far as we withdraw from the outside world and pay attention to
what goes on in our minds, actually derives its reality from its appearance in the
outside world and its interactions with others. That is why, for instance, solitary
confinement is a very effective instrument of torture. Under such conditions it is not
only very hard to hold on to one’s sense of reality, but first and foremost, to one’s
sense of self. The authenticity and solidity of one’s sense of self does not find its
source in the interior recesses of the mind but, on the contrary, in the appearance of
the self in the world through word and deed—which makes us visible, audible, and
real to others and, through the acknowledgment and reactions of others, to
ourselves.
The Ethics Lab and the Risk of Methodological Solipsism
Arendt’s observations with respect to the limitations of scientific, philosophical, and
literary narratives derive from a keen sense of the disparity of the experiential
conditions of inner and outer world. Whereas pluralism is the defining feature of
human speech and action in the outer world, solipsism is an illusion generated by
the activities of the inner world.8 What is decisive in this respect is not the content
of representations but the fact that we are alone (solus) with ourselves (ipse) while
reading and reflecting. Speaking and acting in the outer world, by contrast, wouldn’t
be possible without minimal acknowledgment of the people one speaks to or acts
with as other people, that is, as persons both separate and different from myself. If
solipsism persists in the interaction with people in the outer world, we perceive it as
a pathological condition: for instance, autism. The inner world of reading, writing
and reflection predisposes to another attitude with respect to contingency as well.
Whereas engagement in the outer world and interaction with other people exposes
us directly and uncontrollably to the contingency of human affairs, withdrawal into
the inner world of reading, writing, and reflection gives one the chance to control
contingency by fitting events and affairs into the pattern of a narrative.
Without acknowledgment of the dissimilar experiential conditions of inner and
outer world, the ethics lab of literature is more likely to impair than improve our
8 For an excellent analysis of Arendt’s argument concerning the solipsist fallacy and other ‘‘metaphysical
fallacies’’ (Arendt 1971/1978, pp. 11–16), see Jacques Taminiaux (1992, Chap. 4).
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understanding and judgment of life’s moral complexities because of the risk of
methodological solipsism. I use the term ‘‘methodological solipsism’’ to refer to the
unwitting generalization of (the standards of) inner world experience, and the
concomitant misappraisal of contingency and plurality. In the remainder of this
section I will provide an analysis of the implications of this claim and an argument
for its likelihood.
Together with the pressures of real life, the ethics lab of literature suspends the
impact of contingency and plurality. Human interaction in the outer world is
contingent in the sense of having unpredictable and sometimes unprecedented
consequences. Even when they are carefully planned and carried out, the words and
deeds of human agents are unpredictable with respect to their future impact and
meaning for the simple reason that we cannot know in advance with certainty the
consequences they will have and the various ways in which they will figure in stories,
accounts, and explanations in the future (Arendt 1958/1989, pp. 191–192). The
unpredictable consequences of human interaction include that the latter might give
rise to new, unprecedented states of affairs. For Arendt, the paradigmatic example of
an unprecedented new phenomenon was the rise of totalitarianism, and especially
Nazism, in the first half of the 20th century. A prominent contemporary example,
albeit on a different scale, would be the terrorist attack of 9/11. Because of these
unpredictable and, sometimes, unprecedented consequences of human interaction, it
is only by hindsight, if at all, that we are able to assess the impact and meaning, the
consequences and implications, of acts, facts and events; an assessment that, in
principle, is never exhaustive or definitive because of the plurality of interpretations
and the open future of human history. In short, contingency and plurality don’t allow
for closure. Literature may evoke or bear witness to the plural, unpredictable and
unprecedented character of human affairs, but narratives cannot but replace the shock
of the new and the open-endedness of real-life contingency and plurality with
mimetic closure. In contrast to real life circumstances, readers of narratives find
themselves in the comfortable position of being protected against the shock of the
new,9 and of being able to follow the chain of events to the end. And even if a story
has an open end, plays with the conventions of the genre and the expectations of the
reader, and introduces a plurality of perspectives, a narrative, in stark contrast with
real life circumstances, always affords an overview and a sense of closure. Because
understanding real life is without any closure Arendt insists that understanding is an
‘‘unending’’ task of coming to terms with a plural, unpredictable and ever new
human reality (1994, pp. 307–308).
In addition to the lack of closure and overview, real life plurality presents another
complication. Adequate understanding and judgment of acts, facts, and events
requires that one is able to widen and transform the subjectivity of one’s own
perspective with the perspectives of others. In the ethics lab this endeavor proceeds
9 Literature, and narratives in general, cannot give us the shock of the new. In regard to newness,
narratives are either mimetic, articulating, and repeating the new phenomenon in order to make sense of
it, or they try to evoke a (fictional) new state of affairs themselves. But in both cases, the only shock we
are likely to register, if at all, is a shock of recognition. The shock of the new is the (traumatic) experience
of being confronted with a state of affairs one does not understand and cannot get a grip on—at the time
when it happens—because it is completely new and unexpected.
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without exposure to real others. This lack diminishes the experiential and cognitive
value of the ethics lab significantly. Real others are much more likely to correct,
resist, and check the assumptions inherent in my perspective than the represented
others I encounter in the textual world because unlike the latter, real others talk
back, react to, and otherwise interfere with the way I perceive and interpret things.
As the confrontation with conflicting and incompatible perspectives is nearly
inescapable, interaction with real others teaches the hard lesson that enlarging and
transforming the subjectivity of one’s viewpoint is an open-ended, messy business
which lacks the intellectual satisfaction of coherence and full intelligibility. In the
inner world of the ethics lab, by contrast, we are more likely to absorb only what fits
our frame of reference and, thus, to simply extend our subjective viewpoint through
the integration of compatible perspectives.
Summing up, the naı¨ve use of the ethics lab—that is, without taking the
dissimilar conditions of inner and outer world into account—might install the
illusion that it is possible to master the contingency and plurality of the outer world.
Guided solely by inner world experience where coherence and intelligibility are
within reach and afford a sense of mastery or ‘‘cognitive success,’’ the messy and
opaque open-endedness of real life experience, instead of providing a necessary
correction and antidote, will simply be perceived as flawed, to be improved upon in
the ethics lab. Another probable consequence of methodological solipsism is that
the extended subjective viewpoint will be mistaken for impartiality, whereas
conflicting and incompatible perspectives that challenge coherence and intelligibil-
ity are ignored.
If the naı¨ve use of the ethics lab runs the risk of methodological solipsism, what
does it take, in methodological terms, to use the ethics lab critically? Critical use
requires acknowledgment of the distinct and, by itself, limited, cognitive value of
inner world and outer world experience. This acknowledgment allows the
application of the two sets of experience in such a way that they enhance each
other. The ethics lab experience enables one to extend one’s viewpoint and frame of
reference, and to clarify, adjust, and nuance cognitions, beliefs, and convictions one
already possesses. What it seldom does, by itself, is truly change and widen one’s
viewpoint and frame of reference: that is, transform them in a way that the resulting
viewpoint and frame of reference allow one to see and understand new things that
one didn’t see and understand before—because they were not consistent with one’s
former frame of reference and unintelligible from one’s former point of view.
Transformation of this kind usually requires experiences in the outer world that
override the inner world standards of intelligibility and coherence, like the shock of
the new. Exposure to new, shocking, strange, and incomprehensible events, acts, or
facts does not, of course, by itself accomplish transformation of one’s viewpoint and
frame of reference. In addition, one must be willing and committed to the
‘‘unending task of understanding,’’ as Arendt calls it. And that is where the ethics
lab comes in: it may help to make sense of this kind of outer world experiences that
have a strong impact and are, at the same time, not really comprehensible. A
variation on the Kantian principle of experience sums up nicely how the two sets of
experiences may be applied to enhance each other: whereas the shock of the new
and similar outer world experiences will remain ‘‘blind’’ without the cognitive
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processes of the inner world, the latter will remain ‘‘empty,’’ in the sense of
generalizing the subjective viewpoint and frame of reference without learning
anything truly new, without the input of the former.
Nussbaum’s use of the ethics lab is not critical in the above sense. It hardly can
be, for her use is limited, mostly, to bridging the gap between belief and theory,
more precisely, between the moral cognition and intuition of ordinary people as
represented in narratives on the one hand, and the claims and arguments of moral
philosophy and ethics on the other. What is strikingly absent in Nussbaum’s work is
the driving force of Arendt’s work: the attempt to make sense of real life experience
with the help of narrative resources. The most prominent and controversial example
of such an attempt is Arendt’s report, and subsequent reflection, on the Eichmann
trial she witnessed in Jerusalem 1961. Arendt was struck by the banality of this
man—who was responsible for the smooth execution of the Endlo¨sung, the Nazi
policy of extermination of the Jewish population. Instead of anti-Semitism and other
evil motives one would expect, Eichmann, according to Arendt, demonstrated
nothing so much as thoughtlessness and lack of imagination. In order to make sense
of this unexpected experience, Arendt returns to the question of thoughtlessness in
The Life of the Mind where she proceeds to investigate the hypothesis that the use of
imagination and the activity of thinking ‘‘condition’’ men ‘‘against evil-doing’’
(1971/1978, p. 5) with her usual recourse to narrative resources of all kinds, ranging
from the Apostle Paul to Kafka, and from Herodotus to Paul Vale´ry.
Though there are enough references to real life experiences in Nussbaum’s work,
sustained interpretation of, and reflection on, real life experience with the help of the
ethics lab are missing.10 Instead of showing how the ethics lab may help close the
gap between living life and understanding it, Nussbaum stays in the inner world of
reading and reflection, detailing and adjusting the claims and arguments of moral
philosophy with the help of narrative material—despite her claim that the ethics lab
might improve the understanding and judgment of life’s moral complexities. This,
by itself, could already be taken as evidence of methodological solipsism, for
Nussbaum apparently thinks that inner world and outer world experience are similar
enough for the former to substitute for the latter. It would also explain her consistent
tendency to conflate (literary) representation with the represented real thing, as
Eaglestone has pointed out, and self-understanding with understanding a text
(Wheater 2004, p. 217).
However that may be, I prefer to address the question why Nussbaum—who
appears to have such a clear view of the methodological role of narratives, in
contrast to Arendt, who hardly ever reflects on the methodology of her use of
narratives—at the same time omits substantiation of the important claim that the
ethics lab might help improve the understanding of real life experience. My answer
will be that this omission is probably due to Nussbaum’s application of cognitive
theory. The final thesis I want to defend is that cognitive theory tends to reduce the
10 The one exception would probably be the real life example of the death of Nussbaum’s mother in
Upheavals of Thought. However, this example mostly concerns inner world experience that isn’t likely to
make one aware of the consequences of contingency and plurality, and is treated accordingly. Apart from
other (existential) reasons Nussbaum might have had for the choice of this real life example, I don’t think
it is coincidental that it fits her inner world emphasis.
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cognitive value of outer world experience and, hence, predisposes to methodolog-
ical solipsism, evidence of which can be found in the conception of emotions
elaborated in Upheavals of Thought.
The Cognitive Value of Emotions
Underlying cognitive theory is an implicit mentalist ontology that takes human
beings primarily as minds; that is, as centers of perception, emotion, and thought,
located in the interior space of the body and, therefore, separated from the outer
world of things, events, and other human beings. In the phenomenological tradition
this unacknowledged Cartesian heritage has been criticized as an ontological and
epistemological mistake. Starting with Heidegger’s elaboration, in Being and Time,
of being-in-the-world as the primary ontological condition of human beings and
followed by Merleau-Ponty’s argument, in The Phenomenology of Perception, that
the body’s perceptions and capacities open up the world and enable us to move
around in it with confidence,11 phenomenologists understand the ontological and
epistemological condition of human beings in different and, I contend, more
realistic terms. Human beings are embodied creatures who spend most of their lives
not enclosed in their minds but, on the contrary, doing things in the world, e.g.
driving cars, talking with people, cooking dinner, and watching TV. It is not the
inner world of the mind but our thoroughly worldly existence that enables and
shapes the sense of reality on which cognition and adequate moral conduct depend.
The understanding of human beings as embodied worldly beings shifts the
epistemological emphasis from ‘‘knowing that,’’ i.e. the representational structures
of explicit cognition, to the implicit cognitive contribution of ‘‘knowing how’’
which results from embodied practices, and of emotion as a specific disclosure of
reality.
Because of its mentalist presuppositions, cognitive theory tends toward a
representational, self-referential, and disembodied model of the mind. This model
entails that outer world experience results in cognition only if it can be represented
in some way in the inner world of the mind, and if the representations can be
somehow incorporated in one’s frame of reference, viewpoint, and set of beliefs,
convictions, and knowledge. Compared to the phenomenological model, this
representational model of cognition is extremely reductive, for it filters the most
important source of cognitive content, outer world experience, in such a way that
most experiential know-how is lost. In addition, it excludes the specific cognitive
contribution of emotion. As it conceives the mind basically as an active
disembodied agent, processing all kinds of external (outer world) and internal
(inner world) input, the cognitive model tends to overlook the passive or receptive
dispositions of the embodied mind, of which emotion is the most important instance.
Emotion implies that one is not doing but undergoing something. To be moved or
affected by something requires a receptive, though attentive, openness of the mind,
11 The body can do this because it is intentional or, rather, intentionality is a feature of human beings as
embodied minds, and not simply of minds. Cf. Vasterling (2003).
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distinct from, and often eluding the grasp of, the active, filtering, representing, and
appraising functions of the mind. The receptive emotional disposition therefore
enables the embodied mind to register, in the form of emotions, new phenomena or
well-known phenomena in a new light, while the active functions of the mind
remain blank because the emotional awareness is not (as yet or fully) translatable in
representations. For example, as a teenager in the seventies in the rural Catholic
South of the Netherlands, I increasingly suffered from feelings of disgust, shame
and humiliation that I wasn’t able to explain or even acknowledge for what they
were. It took me two decades before I found out what these emotions were trying to
tell me. At that age—and in the changing, more liberal atmosphere of the seventies
with its second awakening of feminism—disgust, shame, and humiliation consti-
tuted the unwitting but very appropriate reaction to and registration of exposure to
behavior that only much later was commonly recognized as sexist and abusive.
The conception of emotions Nussbaum elaborates in Upheavals of Thought
follows the representational and self-referential model of the mind, as is clear from
Nussbaum’s own summarizing statements: ‘‘Upheaval argues that emotions are
evaluative appraisals that ascribe high importance to things and people that lie
outside the agent’s own sphere of control’’ (2004a, p. 443). ‘‘Emotions always
concern an object or objects that, from the agent’s point of view, are appraised as
important in the agent’s scheme of goals,’’ and as such, emotions entail ‘‘self-
reference’’ (2004b, p. 477). It is not surprising that Upheavals of Thought does not
contain any consideration or acknowledgment of the cognitive (and moral) value of
emotion as a receptive disposition of the embodied mind. Even if the states of
emotional awareness to which it gives rise may, in due time, become translatable
and consequently available for the self-referential appraising function of the mind—
as in my example—Nussbaum’s conception of emotions is incapable of grasping the
truly important cognitive value that emotional states of this kind may have: their
transformational quality. Exactly because of its receptive disposition, emotion may
make us aware of new phenomena, or throw a new light on known phenomena; an
awareness which, in due time, may transform our viewpoint, frame of reference, and
scheme of goals and ends, instead of merely extending it.
The other reason why I have chosen this example is that it features the feelings of
shame, disgust, and humiliation. In an extended argument in the first part of
Upheavals of Thought Nussbaum contends that the ‘‘cognitive content’’ of shame
and disgust is likely to be ‘‘false or distorted, and linked with self-deception’’
(2001, p. 454). My example indicates that that argument might be simply wrong.
Nussbaum’s argument is the result of her one-sided focus on the self-reference of
emotions and her blindness to emotion’s receptivity. For this reason she doesn’t
seem to realize that the cognitive content of negative and ‘‘primitive’’ emotions like
shame and disgust might be more revealing of occurrences in the outer world than of
the self’s assumptions or predispositions.
Nussbaum does not only fail to acknowledge the transformational quality of
emotions. More seriously, she doesn’t seem to be aware of the fact that
transformation might be something more than, and distinct from, extension. When
Nussbaum explicitly ponders the issue of ‘‘ethical change,’’ she only considers the
question of how we can extend our scheme of goals and ends (2004b, pp. 484–486).
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As I pointed out before, the crucial difference between extension and transformation
of (in this case) one’s scheme of goals and ends is that only in the latter case one has
learned something truly new as a consequence of (most likely) outer world
experience.
What these instances of blindness have in common is the reduction of embodied
worldly experience in favor of inner world experience, standards, and features. As
such, they are, I think, a clear sign of the methodological solipsism which is an
intrinsic danger of much of cognitive theory.
Conclusion
The exposition and argument in this article are not meant to invalidate Nussbaum’s
use of the ethics lab, nor her very careful and extensively elaborated conception of
emotions. On the contrary, it is because I value Nussbaum’s innovative approach
that I have attempted to pinpoint and elucidate what I consider to be a constitutive
flaw that limits the full potential of the approach. The flaw of methodological
solipsism is probably not only due to Nussbaum’s application of cognitive theory:
analytical philosophy’s obsession with consistency, clarity, and coherence comes in
as well. This is an obsession of which Nussbaum is not free, despite her critical
distance to analytical philosophy. Cognitive theory is its most significant source. By
drawing on the work of Arendt, I have tried to show, however briefly and generally,
that hermeneutic phenomenology is, in important respects, better suited to
Nussbaum’s approach to practical philosophy than is cognitive theory.
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